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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LIMITS OF
ARBITRAL AUTHORITY: LESSONS FROM
THE LAW OF CONTRACT
PAUL F. KIRGISt
There are two ways to conceptualize the role of an arbitrator.
First, we might think of an arbitrator as a private judge, hired by
the parties but tasked with performing the same sorts of
functions that public judges normally perform: finding facts and
applying predetermined rules (normally legal rules) to those facts
in order to assign rights and obligations. The other way to
conceptualize the arbitrator's role is as a "contract reader." From
this perspective, the arbitrator serves as the parties' agent,
designated by them in advance to supply the terms of their
agreement that they did not foresee and that are necessary to
resolve a conflict between them.' The arbitrator focuses on the
parties' relationship and interests rather than on the application
of rules to facts.
Of these conceptions, or models, of arbitration, the former
has the longer pedigree. Arbitration has existed as a method of
dispute resolution for centuries, 2 and for most of that time the
formal courts have considered arbitrators to be minor league
judges. In part, that explains their long-lived hostility to
arbitration. Common-law courts saw formal adjudication as too
important and too fundamental a right to be left to minor
leaguers. As a consequence, they typically refused to enforce
t Professor, St. John's University School of Law.
1 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140
(1977) ("Put most simply, the arbitrator is the parties' officially designated 'reader' of
the contract. He (or she) is their joint alter ego for the purpose of striking whatever
supplementary bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated unanticipated
omissions of the initial agreement.").
2 See 14 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 187 (A.L.
Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1964). The other reason courts were hostile to
arbitration was that it cut into their pay, which was tied to court fees. See William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 241 (1979).
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arbitration agreements that would have the effect of "ousting" a
court of its jurisdiction. 3
The model in which the arbitrator is viewed as a contract
reader, what I call the "contractarian model,"4 is of much more
recent vintage. It was put forward early in the twentieth century
by proponents who emphasized the advantages of arbitration in
commercial matters.5 Its most important advocate, indeed the
most important advocate arbitration has ever had, was Julius
Henry Cohen, the principal drafter of what would become the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 6 Probably to make arbitration
more palatable to hostile courts, he stressed that his version of
arbitration would not function as second-class adjudication,
because it would not really involve adjudication at all:
[Arbitration] has a place also in the determination of the
simpler questions of law-the questions of law which arise out
of then daily relations between merchants as to the passage of
title, the existence of warranties, or the questions of law which
are complementary to the questions of fact which we have just
mentioned. It is not the proper method for deciding points of
law of major importance involving constitutional questions or
policy in the application of statutes.7
The contractarian model made sense when applied to
commercial relationships because the merchants who employed it
typically subscribed to a common set of business practices. When
they had disputes, they wanted neutrals grounded in those
practices to make decisions based on custom and mutual interest.
3 See Vynior's Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 595-96 (K.B.); Kill v. Hollister,
(1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532, 532 (K.B.); Thompson v. Charnock, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep.
1310, 1310 (K.B.) (Kenyon, C.J.); Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868). Judge
Cardozo explained the ouster principle in Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin &
Clearfield R.R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914):
If jurisdiction is to be ousted by contract, we must submit to the failure of
justice that may result from these and like causes. It is true that some
judges have expressed the belief that parties ought to be free to contract
about such matters as they please. In this state the law has long been
settled to the contrary.
Id. at 354, 105 N.E. at 656.
4 See Paul F. Kirgis, The Contractarian Model of Arbitration and Its
Implications for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 85 OR. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006).
5 See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 18
(1918).
6 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-
NATIONALIZATION-INTERNATIONALIZATION 194 n.36 (1992).
7 Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926) (emphasis added).
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They did not want anyone, whether a genuine judge or a minor
league one, to mechanically apply fixed legal rules.
With Cohen as its champion, the American Bar Association's
Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law succeeded
in pushing the FAA through Congress.8 The FAA was intended
to overcome the judiciary's resistance to arbitration, and it seems
clearly to assume a role for the arbitrator consistent with the
contractarian model. That perspective comes through in the
provisions for judicial review of awards. Section 10 of the FAA
contains a list of four grounds for vacating arbitral awards:
(1) [Wlhere the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means;
(2) [W]here there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) [W]here the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) [Wlhere the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.9
Notably absent is any provision for overturning an award
because the arbitrator got the law wrong. If arbitrators were
understood to be applying mandatory legal rules, such as
substantive statutes, it would make sense to have some way for
courts to ensure the correct application of law. But if arbitrators
were understood only to be carrying out the parties' agreement,
the only review required would ensure that the arbitrator was in
fact neutral and in fact interpreted the agreement. And that is
precisely what Section 10 requires.
For many years after the passage of the FAA, the Supreme
Court held dual conceptions of arbitration. As of about 1960, the
Court viewed labor arbitration (which technically does not fall
under the FAA but has been assumed to operate under the same
rules)1 ° from a contractarian perspective. In United Steelworkers
8 See MACNEIL, supra note 6, at 41, 92-94, 101.
9 9 U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. 2005).
10 See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987)
("[Tihe federal courts have often looked to the [Federal Arbitration] Act for guidance
in labor arbitration cases.").
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of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,1 one of the cases in
the celebrated Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court declared:
[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the
arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the
courts have no business overruling him because their
interpretation of the contract is different from his.12
Labor arbitration is comparable to commercial arbitration in
that the parties are often involved in a long-term relationship in
which they expect disputes to be resolved by reference to past
practice, custom, and general equity rather than rigid legal rules.
Although the Court never heard a commercial arbitration case
during this period, it seems likely it would have treated such a
case much the way it treated the labor cases-by keeping its
hands off and enforcing both the agreement and the award.
In other cases, however, the Court held a very different view
of arbitration. The most important of these was Wilko v. Swan,13
the 1953 decision in which the Court refused to compel
arbitration of a dispute between an investor and a broker arising
under the Securities Act of 1933.14 The Court worried that the
arbitrators would not have a judge to instruct them on the law
and, even conceding their obligation to apply the law, would be
under no obligation to produce a reasoned opinion allowing for
meaningful judicial review. 15 It unmistakably viewed arbitration
as a substitute for court adjudication, and as a poor one at that.
This dichotomy of approach continued for decades, until the
1980s, when an increasingly conservative Supreme Court
concluded that the right to court adjudication of mandatory legal
rules wasn't such a big deal after all. The key case was
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,16 which
involved a dispute arising out of an international commercial
agreement. 17  As a case involving relatively sophisticated
commercial trading partners, the case seemed to fit within the
contractarian model. But unlike the quotidian commercial
11 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
12 Id. at 598.
13 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
14 Id. at 428, 438.
15 Id. at 436.
16 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
17 See id. at 616-18.
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disputes envisioned by Julius Cohen, it implicated important
statutory legal rules: the antitrust laws.18  Paying lip service
to the need for accurate determinations of statutory rights,
the Supreme Court held the antitrust claims arbitrable. 19
It concluded that the statutory rights at issue could be
"effectively ... vindicate[d]" in arbitration.20
After Mitsubishi, everything changed. The door to arbi-
tration had been cracked, and the Court then threw it open.
Mitsubishi had provided a precedent for arbitrating statutory
claims, and in a series of decisions over the next decade, the
Court enforced agreements to arbitrate claims under the
securities laws,21 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 22 and the federal discrimination
laws. 23 None of those cases involved commercial trading partners
of the type seen in Mitsubishi or contemplated by the drafters of
the FAA. The Supreme Court has yet to find a statutory claim
that it believes is not subject to binding contractual arbitration,
regardless of the parties or their relationships.
Effectively, Mitsubishi and its progeny killed off the
adjudicative model as an important conception of arbitration.
The Supreme Court simply stopped talking about the limits of
arbitration as a mechanism for the adjudication of legal rights.
Once the Court decided that any and all claims could be
arbitrated, it funneled everything into the framework of the FAA,
with its contractarian approach to arbitration. While it never
expressly declared that arbitration of discrimination claims or
consumer fraud claims fit within a contractarian model, as a
practical matter, those claims were governed by the same rules
that governed traditionally contractarian matters such as labor
and commercial disputes. Most notably from my perspective,
they all received the same extremely deferential standard of
judicial review.
This is the issue I will address here. The expansion of
arbitrability has been accompanied by a narrowing of the
grounds for judicial review of arbitral awards. The Court in
18 Id. at 634-35.
19 See id. at 625, 626, 628-29.
20 Id. at 636-37.
21 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479,
486 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222, 238 (1987).
22 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223, 242.
23 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
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Wilko had vaguely suggested that courts could vacate an award
rendered in "manifest disregard" of the law: "[I]nterpretations of
the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are
not subject ... to judicial review for error in interpretation."24
Whatever that meant, it at least indicated that courts had the
power to oversee the legal decisionmaking of arbitrators to
ensure some degree of adherence to legal rules. But, as the Court
retreated from Wilko, it adopted an increasingly deferential
posture toward arbitral awards. For instance, the Court said in
several cases in the 1980s that awards could be vacated if they
violated public policy. 25 Lower courts had relied on the public
policy grounds to vacate awards that produced results contrary to
the public interest.26 In Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United
Mine Workers of America,27 however, the Court curbed that line
of cases by suggesting that an award should be vacated on public
policy grounds only if it required the parties to engage in illegal
conduct. 2 As a result of that decision, public policy has virtually
ceased to be a viable avenue for attacking awards.
The bottom line is that awards are rarely vacated by courts
on any grounds. They are almost never vacated on grounds
related to the substance of the award. After the Court reiterated
the manifest disregard test in dicta in First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan,29 the number of attacks on awards on substantive
grounds increased, but courts have overwhelmingly refused to
vacate on those grounds.30 Consistent with an approach that
24 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (emphasis added).
25 See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42-43
(1987); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
26 See Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy
Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 91, 95-100
(2000) (collecting cases since 1960) (citing Peter Feuille & Michael LeRoy, Grievance
Arbitration Appeals in the Federal Courts, 45 ARB. J. 34, 44 (1990)).
27 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
28 See id. at 66, 67.
29 514 U.S. 938, 942, 943 (1995).
30 1 am aware of three circuit court decisions since 2000 vacating or affirming
the vacatur of awards on manifest disregard grounds. See Hardy v. Walsh Manning
Sec., L.L.C., 341 F.3d 126, 127-28, 134 (2d Cir. 2003); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 843, 844, 845, 849 (6th Cir. 2003); Gas Aggregation Servs.,
Inc. v. Howard Avista Energy, LLC, 319 F.3d 1060, 1062, 1069 (8th Cir. 2003).
During that period, at least eighty-three published district court opinions discussed
manifest disregard as a grounds for vacating an award. Not one of them resulted in
a vacatur. See Kirgis, supra note 4, at 25-26.
[Vol. 81:99
JUDICIAL REVIEW
sees arbitration as a contractual matter of the parties' choosing,
courts simply refuse to get involved. They enforce agreements to
arbitrate and they decline to review the subsequent awards. The
assumption that legal rights are adequately protected in
arbitration goes unexamined.
I. ADJUDICATION AND DUE PROCESS
We have a long, established tradition in this country of
requiring certain procedural guarantees as a condition of
adjudicating legal rights and obligations. The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments bar the state and federal governments
from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. 31 Due process has been interpreted to include
substantive and procedural components. Substantive due
process requires that the government have a legitimate reason
for the deprivation of life, liberty, or property.32 Procedural due
process requires that the government follow adequate procedures
when it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. 33
Matthews v. Eldridge4 is the primary case defining the
procedures required under the doctrine of procedural due
process. The Supreme Court in Matthews set up a balancing test
requiring consideration of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.35
31 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law...."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... ).
32 See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (stating that
the Fifth Amendment requires that a deprivation be accompanied by due process,
which in turn demands that there be a legitimate basis for the deprivation).
33 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)
(emphasizing that "the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive
rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to
constitutionally adequate procedures").
34 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
35 Id. at 335.
2007]
ST. JOHN'S LA W REV1EW
If arbitration were understood to function as a species of
adjudication, the Matthews factors would almost certainly
require some degree of judicial review. Cases involving federal
discrimination and consumer fraud laws implicate important
private interests under the first factor. Given the rate at which
federal district courts are overturned on appeal,36 we have to
assume that arbitrators make errors of law with some frequency.
Under the second factor, judicial review would be an effective
procedural safeguard to reduce those errors. The fiscal and
administrative burdens imposed on the government are no
different than those required when disputes do not involve
arbitration, so the third factor would not outweigh those
interests.
The conclusion that due process would require some degree
of judicial review of arbitral awards is bolstered by the fact that
in every other adjudicative context, we provide for a level of
review. Courts are universally subject to at least one level of
review, even if it is available only through certiorari. And
administrative agencies of all kinds have their decision making
subjected to review by courts. In the absence of a grant of
appellate-type review-as provided under the Administrative
Procedures Act 37-individuals adversely affected by the actions of
government officials have long had recourse to the courts through
common-law "officer suits." 38 Even where Congress has expressly
attempted to preclude judicial review of administrative
determinations, courts have often held that review of statutory
questions and general questions of law must be available. 39
Of course, if arbitration does not come under the aegis of
Matthews, all of that is irrelevant. The main argument for why
due process protections, including the right to judicial review, do
not apply to arbitration is that arbitration does not involve
state action. Because the due process clauses apply only to
deprivations of life, liberty, or property by state actors, no
due process protection applies to entirely private conduct.
Arbitrators are private decision makers, so the facile conclusion
is that no due process protections apply to their awards.
36 See Kirgis, supra note 4, at 36-37.
37 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
38 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 332 (1993).
39 See id. at 334-35.
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But as Richard Reuben has cogently argued, there are good
reasons to treat arbitrators as state actors. 40 The Supreme Court
set out the test for identifying state action when quasi-
adjudicative procedures are challenged in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.,4 1 in which the Court held that a peremptory
challenge exercised by a private litigant in civil litigation could
constitute state action. Relying on Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 42 the Court applied a two-part test, asking "first whether the
claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a
right or privilege having its source in state authority, and second,
whether the private party charged with the deprivation could be
described in all fairness as a state actor."43 The Court explained
further that the second component required consideration of "the
extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance
and benefits, whether the actor is performing a traditional
governmental function, and whether the injury caused is
aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental
authority."44
The first prong of the analysis seems easily satisfied in the
arbitration context. Binding contractual arbitration would not
exist without statutory authorization. And once an award is
made, it is subject to judicial confirmation and then enforceable
as a judgment. The right to compel arbitration and enforce the
resulting award clearly derives from state authority.
Application of the second prong is more complex, but still
seems to indicate state action. The first sub-test for whether an
arbitrator can be considered a state actor addresses the extent
of governmental assistance and benefits. Without question,
arbitration depends heavily on the support of the state. Courts
both compel arbitration and enforce arbitral awards. Without
that assistance, arbitration would cease to exist. The raison
d'etre for the FAA was that arbitration could not function
effectively without judicial recognition and enforcement. The
40 See Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 619, 625 (1997).
41 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
42 457 U.S. 922 (1982). In Lugar, the Supreme Court held that the attachment
of private property by a private litigant under a state statute could constitute state
action if the private litigant acted jointly with a state actor. Id. at 941.
43 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620 (citation omitted).
44 Id. at 621-22 (citations omitted).
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FAA exists to provide governmental assistance and benefits to
parties seeking to use binding arbitration.
The second sub-test is also easily resolved, as long as one
adopts the adjudicative model (as I am assuming throughout this
discussion). Arbitration is a substitute for public adjudication, at
least in cases involving mandatory legal rules, and public
adjudication is beyond doubt a traditional government function.
The third sub-test, considering the extent to which the injury
is aggravated by governmental authority, is more difficult to
apply, simply because it is not clear what the Court meant. In
Edmonson, the Court found an aggravation of the discrimination
against the challenged juror due to the fact that the
discriminatory event happened in a public courthouse. 45 Perhaps
the fact that an adverse arbitral award may be confirmed and
entered as a judgment would satisfy that prong. Professor
Reuben points to the fact that arbitration removes important
disputes from the public realm as evidence of a broader societal
harm. 46 In any event, application of this sub-test seems of less
importance given the apparently strong indicia of state action
under the first two sub-tests.
If this analysis seems tidy, it has not persuaded the courts.
In a series of decisions at both the federal and state levels, courts
have rejected arguments that either arbitration itself or the
judicial confirmation of arbitral awards constitutes state action.47
For example, in Davis v. Prudential Securities, Inc.,48 the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether the due process clause
required judicial review of an arbitral award assessing punitive
damages, under the Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.49 Relying on Supreme Court cases
holding that regulated industries and the NCAA were not state
actors, the Davis court found that "the arbitration was a private
proceeding arranged by a voluntary contractual agreement of the
45 Id. at 628.
46 See Reuben, supra note 40, at 633-41.
47 See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9
(9th Cir. 1987); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp.
1460, 1466 (N.D. Ill. 1997); United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 708 F. Supp. 95, 96, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); MedVaIUSA Health Programs,
Inc. v. MemberWorks, Inc., 872 A.2d 423, 428 (Conn. 2005).
48 59 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1995).
49 499 U.S. 1 (1991); see also Davis, 59 F.3d at 1190.
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parties" and so did not constitute state action. 50 The court also
concluded that judicial confirmation of the award did not
constitute state action because confirmation amounted to nothing
more than judicial enforcement of a private contract. 51
Davis emphasizes the contractual nature of arbitration as a
reason not to apply due process. The Seventh Circuit's decision
in Smith v. American Arbitration Ass'n 52 is even more explicit in
invoking a contractarian conception of arbitration to escape the
logic of Edmonson. Smith held that a party to arbitration did not
have a right under the equal protection clause to a panel of
arbitrators containing at least one person of that party's
gender.53 Writing for the court, Judge Posner emphasized that
"[a]rbitration is a private self-help remedy."54  Tellingly, he
described the arbitration process in these terms:
When arbitrators issue awards, they do so pursuant to the
disputants' contract-in fact the award is a supplemental
contract obligating the losing party to pay the winner. The fact
that the courts enforce these contracts, just as they enforce
other contracts, does not convert the contracts into state or
federal action and so bring the equal protection clause into
play.55
Like the other courts that have addressed the state action issue,
the court never seriously attempted to apply the Edmonson test.
As these cases make clear, courts have avoided the difficult
due process issues arbitration presents by resorting to a
contractarian conception of the arbitration process. If the
arbitration process is simply an extension of the parties'
contractual relationship, then the award is equivalent to a
contract term. Under a large body of precedent, court
enforcement of private contract terms does not constitute state
action. Without state action, there can be no due process
violation. No further analysis is needed, and neither Judge
Posner nor the other courts that have considered this question
give any.
50 Davis, 59 F.3d at 1191.
51 Id. at 1191, 1192.
52 232 F.3d 502 (2000).
53 Id. at 504.
5 Id. at 507.
55 Id. (emphasis added).
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So let's take these courts at their word. Let's concede that
arbitration is best understood as a species of contract rather than
a species of adjudication so that due process does not require a
heightened level of judicial review. What consequences follow?
Can we then justify the extreme deference courts pay to
arbitrators?
II. ARBITRATION AS THE WAIVER OF LEGAL RIGHTS
Imagine a case raising a straightforward legal issue-say, an
employment discrimination case under a statute providing for an
award of attorneys' fees to a victorious plaintiff. In a court of
law, there would be no question about the attorneys' fees
provision; if the plaintiff won, the plaintiff would get attorneys'
fees. But assume that the case goes to arbitration under a clause
in the employment contract. The arbitrator finds that the
employer discriminated against the plaintiff and awards
damages but refuses to award attorneys' fees.
Under an adjudicative conception of arbitration, this would
constitute an error of law. The decision denying attorneys' fees
would be reversible under either a de novo standard or even some
lesser standard like abuse of discretion. Under a contractarian
conception of arbitration, however, the arbitrator's decision is
treated as a contract term agreed upon by the parties ex ante.
The plaintiff would be understood to have waived, in the
employment agreement, the right to recover attorneys' fees
incident to a discrimination grievance.
That type of "arbitral waiver" occurs whenever an arbitrator
makes a decision that would have been overturned on appeal had
a court made the same decision. The attorneys' fees scenario
I posited comes from a reported case, DiRussa v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.56 The arbitrators awarded the plaintiff compen-
satory damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA") but refused to grant him attorneys' fees even
though the ADEA expressly mandates the award of attorneys'
fees to a successful plaintiff.57 The Second Circuit recognized
that attorneys' fees should have been awarded under the statute
but concluded that, because the arbitrators did not know that
attorneys' fees were statutorily required, there was no manifest
56 121 F.3d 818, 820-23 (2d Cir. 1997).
57 Id. at 822.
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disregard of the law.58 As a practical matter, the DiRussa court
upheld the plaintiffs waiver of his right to attorneys' fees.
DiRussa is unusual in that the award made the legal
error apparent on its face. Most awards contain little or no
explanation for the arbitrator's decision, so usually it is
impossible to know whether the arbitrator decided the case in a
way contrary to one party's legal rights. For that reason, we
cannot assess with any confidence the extent to which arbitrators
make awards that would be overturned if rendered by a judge in
a comparable court case. But we can be confident that it happens
regularly. The empirical .studies that exist suggest that
arbitrators frequently choose not to follow the law.59 And we
know that district courts are routinely overturned by courts
of appeal. My research indicated that appeals in federal
discrimination cases produce a reversal and/or a remand in about
twenty-five to thirty percent of the cases. 60 Even if the bulk of
those are reversals on procedural grounds, a lot of district courts
are making reversible legal errors. We have no reason to assume
that arbitrators would make errors at a lower rate. "Arbitral
waivers" must be common occurrences.
Again, courts are comfortable with arbitral waivers because
the parties chose to have their contractual disagreements
resolved by an arbitrator. Party autonomy and freedom of
contract dictate that they should be allowed to enter into that
bargain and then be held to it. Or so courts assume. In reality,
though, things are not quite that simple. The problem is that
freedom of contract is not as broad as the courts have tended to
assume. In fact, basic principles of contract law preclude arbitral
waivers in many cases that courts today refuse even to consider.
III. THE LAW OF EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS IN THE
ARBITRATION CONTEXT
People waive their substantive legal rights every day. That
is, after all, what settlement consists of. If I have a claim that I
know would succeed in court but I choose to settle it for some
amount less than I would ultimately receive in order to avoid the
trauma of litigation, I have waived a legal right. For the most
58 Id. at 822-23.
59 See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 719-20 (1999).
60 See Kirgis, supra note 4, at 36.
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part, I am entirely free to do that. There are only a handful of
situations in which a court will scrutinize a settlement between
competent parties.61
Superficially, arbitration looks a lot like settlement.
Arbitration takes place after a dispute has arisen and serves the
purpose of avoiding litigation. But under the contractarian
model of arbitration, the award is treated not as an offshoot of
the adjudicative process but as a term of the original contract.
This makes it very different from settlement. Settlement
happens after legal rights have matured and at a point at which
parties have full information about the rights they are foregoing.
In contrast, parties enter into arbitration agreements long before
they even know the nature of the arbitrated dispute. Not only do
they lack complete information about the rights they may forego,
they may also face power imbalances that make the waiver of
rights only nominally voluntary.
Arbitral waivers, under this conception, are the equivalent
not of settlements, but of exculpatory contracts. An exculpatory
contract is an agreement in which one party agrees to relieve
another party of liability for harms resulting from the conduct of
the latter. Exculpatory contracts typically take the form of
releases or waivers of rights or defenses.
Exculpatory contracts have traditionally been disfavored.
Courts scrutinize them to ensure that they do not compromise
important rights or operate unfairly. In some circumstances,
exculpatory contracts are flatly disallowed. In others, they are
limited. In all cases, they must be manifested in clear and
unambiguous language. Here are some of the key rules
governing exculpatory contracts, with their relevance to
arbitration.
Intentional torts. Exculpatory contracts that relieve a party
of liability for its intentional harms are per se unenforceable. In
the words of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: "A term
exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused
intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy."62 The rule is not limited to physical harms, so it would
61 See, e.g., Antitrust Penalties & Procedures Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)
(Supp. 2005) (requiring judges to decide whether antitrust settlements proposed by
the United States are "in the public interest"); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring court
approval for settlement of class actions).
62 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (1981).
[Vol. 81:99
JUDICIAL REVIEW
apply to agreements purporting to absolve a party from such
intentional harms as discrimination and fraud.63
Arbitration is frequently used to resolve claims of intentional
harm. Ever since the Supreme Court backtracked from Wilko,
securities fraud claims of all kinds have been subject to binding
arbitration.64 The Court has also enforced arbitration of fraud
claims under RICO. 65 In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama
v. Randolph,66 the Court ratified the arbitration of consumer
fraud claims as long as the costs of the arbitration were not so
great as to preclude the claimant from pursuing arbitration.67
And in probably its most controversial arbitration decision to
date, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,68 the Court
enforced an arbitration clause in a dispute involving
employment discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967.69 Fraud and discrimination claims
are now arbitration staples.
Public services. Where a party is engaged in providing
important services to the public, exculpatory contracts that
relieve it of liability for its negligence are often held
unenforceable. Most importantly in the arbitration context, the
provision of medical services is considered a public service. In
the leading case, Thnkl v. Regents of the University of
California,70 the UCLA Medical Center required a patient to sign
a release upon admission that relieved the hospital "from any
and all liability for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of
its employees ..... ,71 When an injured patient sued, the
California Supreme Court refused to enforce the release on the
ground that the hospital was providing a public service. 72 Other
courts have also held that the provision of medical treatment
is a public service, for which exculpatory contracts are
unenforceable. 73
63 See 15 GRACE MCLANE GEISEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 88.8 (2003).
64 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-85
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228-34 (1987).
65 McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238-42.
66 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
67 Id. at 82, 90.
68 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
69 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
70 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
71 Id. at 442.
72 Id. at 447.
73 See Leidy v. Deseret Enter., Inc., 381 A.2d 164, 168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977);
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Doctors and hospitals have begun to include provisions in
their contracts with patients requiring arbitration of disputes,
including medical malpractice claims. A study in California in
the late 1990s found that nine percent of physicians and
hospitals in the state used arbitration agreements but that
the number was growing rapidly. 74  Health maintenance
organizations have been more aggressive. The same study found
that seventy-one percent of HMOs in California included
arbitration clauses in their contracts with members. 75  The
nation's largest HMO, Kaiser Permanente, requires all its
subscribers to agree to arbitration.7 6
Courts have split on the question of whether these
agreements should be enforced. In Broemmer v. Abortion
Services of Phoenix, Ltd.,77 the Arizona Supreme Court refused to
enforce an agreement requiring a patient to arbitrate her medical
malpractice claim against her physician. The court found the
agreement unreasonable because it appeared in a contract of
adhesion and did not involve a conspicuous and explicit waiver of
the right to a jury trial.78  Earlier cases from Nevada and
California had reached similar conclusions. 79 More recently,
however, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Buraczynski v.
Eyring80 enforced an arbitration agreement in a malpractice case
between a patient and her doctor.81 The court focused on the fact
that the agreement was on a separate one-page document
entitled "Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreement" that included
a short explanation encouraging the patient to discuss questions
about the agreement with the doctor.8 2 Since 2000, courts in
Alabama, Colorado, Florida, and Idaho have held that arbitration
Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 430, 432 (Tenn. 1977).
74 Elizabeth Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and
Reality, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 171 (1997).
75 Id. at 173.
76 Kathy L. Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal
Aimed at Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 547, 552-53
(2002) (discussing Kaiser's arbitration agreements).
77 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
78 Id. at 1016, 1017.
79 See Benyon v. Garden Grove Med. Group, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150, 152 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980); Obstetrics and Gynecologists William G. Wixted, M.D., Ltd. v.
Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Nev. 1985).
80 919 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1996).
81 Id. at 316.
82 See id. at 321.
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clauses in health care contracts are enforceable under
appropriate conditions.8 3  None of these courts have
acknowledged the potential for an error by an arbitrator to
produce a waiver of the patient's rights that would be
impermissible if framed as an exculpatory contract.
Unequal bargaining power. Unequal bargaining power used
to be almost universally acknowledged as grounds for
invalidating an exculpatory clause. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts stated that exculpatory clauses would not be enforced
"where there is such disparity of bargaining power between the
parties that the agreement does not represent a free choice on
the part of the plaintiff."8 4 More recently, courts have rejected a
per se rule of unenforceability in favor of a rule of strict
construction against the drafter.8 5 The Restatement (Third),
reflecting that trend, provides that "[w]hen an individual
plaintiff passively accepts a contract drafted by the defendant,
the contract is construed strictly, favoring reasonable
interpretations against the defendant."8 6
This change has been accompanied by stricter scrutiny of
exculpatory contractual language. Courts typically require that
exculpatory language be explicit and conspicuous. The New York
Court of Appeals has held that "unless the intention of the
parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an exculpatory
clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for his
own negligent acts."8 7 The Supreme Court of Texas has applied a
broad "fair notice" requirement, which includes both a
requirement that the agreement expressly disclaim liability for
negligence and a "conspicuousness requirement."88  The
83 See Kathrine Kuhn Galle, The Appearance of Impropriety: Making
Agreements to Arbitrate in Health Care Contracts More Palatable, 30 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 969, 992 n.151 (2004).
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 9,
1963).
85 See Crandall v. Bangor Sav. Bank, No. CV-98-239, 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS
304, at *5-6 (Me. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1999) ('The law in Maine appears to be that
where contracts are presented on a 'take it or leave it' basis and the parties do not
have equal bargaining power, the contract may be interpreted to meet the
expectations of the party in the inferior bargaining position." (citations omitted)).
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d
(Proposed Final Draft 1999).
87 Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365,
368 (1979).
88 Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993).
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Restatement (Third) of Torts reiterates that test, noting that
"[c]ourts normally construe exculpatory contracts strictly, finding
that the plaintiff has assumed a risk only if the terms of the
agreement are clear and unequivocal."8 9  These requirements
apply to all exculpatory contracts but are especially relevant
where there is a high disparity in bargaining power.
Outside of the health care context, courts have rarely
required that arbitration clauses be clear and conspicuous, even
in contracts of adhesion. 90 Indeed, in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto,91 the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted
state legislation conditioning the enforceability of arbitration
clauses on special notice requirements. 92 Only California has
recognized the risks posed by inconspicuous arbitration
agreements in contracts of adhesion. In Discover Bank v.
Superior Court,93 the California Supreme Court refused to
enforce an arbitration agreement waiving a consumer's right to
participate in a class action where the arbitration clause was
imposed as an amendment to the cardholder agreement in the
form of a bill-stuffer. 94  The court held such agreements
unconscionable where they "may operate effectively as
exculpatory contract clauses that are contrary to public policy."95
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to take this question up directly;
California's protective approach to consumers may not last long.
In any event, California is unique in recognizing the risks posed
by adhesive arbitration agreements.
89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d,
reporters note (Proposed Final Draft 1999).
90 See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159,
172-75 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding an arbitration clause in a contract between
cellular-telephone customers and their service providers); Vigil v. Sears Nat'l Bank,
205 F. Supp. 2d 566, 568-69 (E.D. La. 2002) (enforcing the arbitration provision in a
contract between a large retailer and its charge card customers); Marsh v. First USA
Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 912, 920 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding enforceable an
arbitration provision in a contract between a bank and its credit card holders).
91 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
92 Id. at 683.
93 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).




IV. A PRAGMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEW OF
ARBITRAL AWARDS
Every time a court refuses to disturb an award that would be
considered remedial legal error if issued by a judge, the court
effectively sanctions the prospective waiver of a legal right.
Where the effect of that waiver is to grant immunity for an
intentional tort, to allow a provider of public services to escape
liability, or to impose an exculpatory contract on a party with
disproportionately low bargaining power and inadequate
knowledge of the rights foregone, the waiver amounts to a
violation of contract law. One logical conclusion to draw is that
courts should review arbitral awards raising those issues on a de
novo standard.96 Logically, if the waiver violates contract law
then the legal error producing the waiver should be reversed-no
deference to the arbitrator is warranted.
That conclusion is attractive from a theoretical standpoint,
but it is not practicable. Courts have shown little interest in
expanding their oversight role with respect to arbitration. They
have been reluctant to accept heightened standards of judicial
review even where the parties expressly agreed to them in an
arbitration agreement.97 A limited increase in judicial review
may be feasible; a dramatic and broad increase in judicial review
is not. Even if courts were willing to take on a greater oversight
role, however, an across-the-board increase in judicial review
would not be desirable because it would unnecessarily constrict
party autonomy in the selection of dispute resolution processes.
Although I have based my argument on the theory that an
arbitrator's award is equivalent to a contract term agreed upon
96 See Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But by How Much? Questions
Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 628 (2001) ("De novo
judicial review of arbitral interpretations of law is necessary to... ensure that
arbitration does not result in contracting out of statutory compliance.").
97 See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir.
2001). The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have suggested in dicta that parties should
not be entitled to contract for heightened review. See Chicago Typographical Union
No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991); UHC Mgmt.
Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 1998). The Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Circuits have held that parties do have a right to contract for heightened
judicial review of arbitral awards. See Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257
F.3d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2001); Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at *16 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (per curiam); Hughes
Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 591-92 (5th Cir. 2001).
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by the parties ex ante, in reality, an arbitral award is different
from a true contract term in important ways. When parties
agree to arbitrate, they do not agree to forego their rights-they
agree to accept the chance that they will forego their rights.
Parties go into arbitration hoping for a favorable decision, and
many times they get it. When they do not, they at least had the
opportunity to present evidence and argue their side. A waiver of
rights under these circumstances is problematic, but it is less
problematic than an express waiver of rights in an exculpatory
agreement.
Furthermore, there is evidence that binding, final
arbitration can benefit claimants, at least some of the time.
Some studies have shown that arbitration is good for employees
with discrimination claims, for example, because its low cost
allows the pursuit of smaller or more speculative claims that no
plaintiffs lawyer operating on a contingency fee would pursue in
court.98 That advantage could be lost if every employee who won
in arbitration faced the prospect of a further round of litigation in
court.
Because of the judicial lack of enthusiasm for stringent
review and these mitigating practical factors, my suggestion is
for a standard of review only modestly higher than the current
policy of total deference. A relatively deferential standard could
ensure basic compliance with legal rules while retaining the
effectiveness of arbitration. Other procedural systems offer
formulations for deferential standards of review that would
achieve these objectives. For example, trial judges review the
decisions of juries by asking whether a reasonable jury could
decide the way that jury decided. 99 Appellate courts review the
factual determinations of trial judges by asking whether the
judge's decision was clearly erroneous and review other
discretionary decisions by asking whether the judge abused her
discretion. 100 Courts review the determinations of administrative
agencies by asking whether the agency's decision is arbitrary and
capricious. 101 It is not clear what difference, if any, there is
98 See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 559,
563-64 (2001).
99 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.4 (4th ed. 2005)
(describing the nature and scope of review).
100 Id.
101 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (stating
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among these standards. Each requires deference to the lower
decision-maker, and each applies some version of a test of
rationality. Any of the three could be adopted, as could an
explicit rationality standard. The exact wording of the test is not
especially significant as long as the court has the power to correct
clear and important errors of law.
That is the basic idea. Several implications follow. First, to
re-emphasize, this heightened standard of review should apply
only in cases where an exculpatory agreement would be
unenforceable. Those cases include intentional torts such as
consumer and securities fraud and discrimination, health care
disputes, and any case with a radical imbalance of power in
which the weaker party is not likely to fully understand the
rights waived by agreeing to arbitration. Needless to say, that
list covers the most contentious areas of arbitral expansion in
recent years.
Second, the heightened standard should apply only to errors
of law. The arbitrator's factual findings should be free from
judicial review outside of the traditional grounds. The
arbitrator's factual findings provide the background for her
decision on the parties' rights and responsibilities going forward.
Under a contractarian model, those findings are the equivalent of
the recitals in a contract. Contract law prevents parties from
bargaining away certain legal rights in certain circumstances. It
says nothing about the factual premises on which the parties
base their agreements.
Even though courts have no reason to review the arbitrator's
factual findings, my proposal would require arbitrators to
memorialize their factual findings and legal conclusions in order
to allow for meaningful judicial review of the legal issues. There
seems to be a trend in this direction anyway, 10 2 but it represents
that the applicable standard of review for administrative agencies determinations is
"arbitrary or capricious" standard); Neiman v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 722 F. Supp. 954, 957 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (reviewing the administrative agency's
determination under the arbitrary standard).
102 Robert N. Covington, Employment Arbitration After Gilmer: Have Labor
Courts Come to the United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345, 394-95 (1998)
(citing recommendations for written opinions in at least some types of arbitrations);
see also Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public
Law Arbitrators Should Be Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 285, 287-88 (2000) (arguing for written, publicly available
opinions in cases involving issues of public law).
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a change from traditional practice in which arbitrators were
expressly encouraged not to create a reviewable record. From
my perspective, this change would be a positive one. The
requirement of writing a reasoned opinion has long served as an
important guarantor of adjudicative fairness. When arbitrators
are called on to decide the sorts of statutory issues traditionally
reserved for courts, and the parties' relationship indicates an
intention to apply legal rules to the dispute, the arbitrators
should provide reasons for their decisions.
Finally, the heightened standard of review I propose should
apply regardless of the terms purportedly agreed upon in the
arbitration clause. To ensure that arbitration does not function
as the imposition of impermissible exculpatory contracts, parties
must not be permitted to prospectively waive their rights to the
application of legal rules in these cases. Therefore, they should
not be able to contract away judicial review even if they attempt
to do so expressly in the agreement. On the other hand, once the
rights in question have matured and the parties have reached
the point of arbitration, the waiver calculus changes. A waiver of
rights after a legal cause of action has matured is simply a
settlement. If the parties mutually decide to give an arbitrator
the freedom to disregard the law at that point-or if they simply
want to guarantee that their dispute will not reach a court-their
wishes should be honored unless a settlement in similar
circumstances would be disallowed.103 The heightened standard
of review, then, should apply presumptively only. Courts should
assume that they have an obligation, in the appropriate cases, to
review arbitral awards for irrationality (or some comparable
standard) unless the parties expressly agree to a different
standard after their dispute reaches the point of arbitration.
CONCLUSION
When arbitrators decide questions raising mandatory legal
rules, such as statutory fraud and discrimination laws, they
engage in something very close to adjudication. If that practice is
deemed equivalent to adjudication, there is no logical reason to
exempt it from the procedural guarantees that apply in every
103 Accord Ware, supra note 59, at 728-29. Professor Ware argues for de novo
review of awards implicating mandatory legal rules, but not for post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate. Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration, in ARBITRATION
LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88, 114 (Edward Brunet et al. eds., 2006).
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other adjudicative context. One of those guarantees is a right to
some level of meaningful review.
Courts avoid facing the due process implications arbitration
raises by applying the same standards to all arbitrations,
whether they arise out of labor disputes, commercial
arrangements, or consumer fraud claims. The standards they
apply assume a model of arbitration rooted in contract rather
than adjudication. They assume that arbitrators act as the
parties' agents tasked with interpreting the parties' agreements
rather than as private adjudicators taking the place of public
judges. Seeing arbitration as purely a voluntary, contractual
enterprise, courts decline to exercise any meaningful review.
My objective here is to show that this sleight of hand will not
accomplish what the courts have assumed it will. Even if
arbitration is a form of contract, there are limits on arbitrators'
authority that must be enforced by courts. Parties are not
permitted to insulate themselves from liability for their
intentional harms or from their obligations in the provision of
public services. They also cannot impose waivers of rights in
contracts of adhesion without clear and conspicuous notice.
Arbitrators should not be permitted to achieve the same results
after the fact. Some modest level of judicial review is required to
ensure that they do not.
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